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Abstract: The World Energy Outlook reports produced by the International Energy Agency have long
been considered the “gold standard” in terms of energy modeling and projecting future trends. It is
thus extremely important to assess how well its projections are aligned with sustainable development
goals as well as closely tracking observed, historical values. In this work we analyzed thirteen sets of
World Energy Outlook projections from the last 25 years. Different scenarios were considered for the
following regions and countries: world, OECD, OECD Europe, OECD North America, China, India,
Russia, and Africa. The maximum variation between the projections for 2030 CO2 emissions from
the energy sector, made between 2006 and 2018 for OECD, Europe and North America were found to
be comparable with the gap between the Paris Agreement goals and the voluntary (unconditional)
nationally determined contributions to remain below a 2 ◦C global temperature increase. For the same
period, projections for the percentage of renewable electricity exhibited maximum variations between
51% and 96%, signaling a huge underestimation. We discuss the significance of overestimating energy
demand and underestimating the rate of renewable energy implementation in the context of 2030
climate and energy policy targets, as well as desirable methodological changes to energy modeling
under aggressive climate mitigation policies.
Keywords: energy system modeling; climate change mitigation; global and regional energy projec-
tions; nationally determined contributions; integrated energy system planning
1. Introduction
Energy systems modeling is now a well-established field of research and an essential
activity for modern societies, contributing to the optimization of economic activities and
also to minimize the associated environmental impacts [1]. After more than four decades
of extensive modeling at international, regional, national, and even local level, energy
systems modeling has arguably achieved a very high degree of maturity [2]. However, the
large number of projections accumulated during this time-period also raises the interesting
question of how well energy projections overall have matched observed historical develop-
ments [3]. In this context, several authors seem to concur that energy scenarios are more
relevant in terms of the qualitative guidelines they can provide for policy implementation
than any quantitative predictions they might contain [4–10].
Probably the most well-known and influential long-term energy projections are the
ones developed by the International Energy Agency (IEA). Since 1977 the IEA has been
publishing energy demand projections for the global economy as a whole, as well as
for several regions and larger individual countries, in the World Energy Outlook (WEO)
reports. These projections were originally developed with the goal of supporting energy
policy making and ensuring energy security, particularly for the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) group of nations [3]. They have since become the
“gold standard” for global and regional energy projections [3,11].
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In our view, the main reasons for this are: the fact that the WEO is published annually
(the only exception since 1994 was for the year 1997); the scope and credibility of the IEA
organization, which is possibly the largest intergovernmental organization in this area of
expertise; and, finally, the level of technical detail and regional disaggregation considered
in successive WEO reports. These arguments in turn have given the WEO projections an
unprecedented level of authority, particularly in the eyes of policy makers [11,12]. Although
several other sources for projections on energy demand, energy technologies, and carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions are widely available in the literature, they either: (i) originate
from oil and gas companies, with a very large and direct financial interest in the results of
their own projections, such as BP, Shell, Statoil, or ExxonMobil, and can thus be reasonably
suspected of at least some bias; (ii) offer very little regional disaggregation, lack technical
detail, or rely mainly on data gathered by other agencies; or, (iii) have only been published
for the first time in recent years, as is the case for recent reports from Greenpeace [13],
the World Wide Fund [14], or the World Energy Council [15], and in most cases lack the
continuity of regular (yearly) updating.
Therefore, we analyze in this work the WEO projections made by the IEA during the
last two and a half decades, focusing on their Current Policies and Reference Scenario.
This builds on recent work by Cabeza et al. [3], in which the authors discussed the general
trends in total energy demand and energy intensity within OECD countries and China
from 1977 to 2013, and how the observed values compared with successive IEA projections.
In the present work we go one step further by also including three other regions: India,
Russia, and the African continent, since all these will be crucial in determining global
energy consumption patterns for the foreseeable future. We also consider a (larger) set of
thirteen WEO reports, instead of only the five (1977, 1982, 1994, 1998, 2004) considered
by Cabeza et al. We further disaggregate the OECD into OECD Europe and OECD North
America and quantify the variation in the projections of total primary energy demand,
the associated CO2 emissions from the energy sector, and the share of electricity from
renewable energy sources for these eight regions (world, OECD, OECD Europe, OECD
North America, China, India, Russia, and Africa).
In another article by Carrington and Stephenson, the authors performed a critical
assessment of the projections from the IEA and other agencies, with an exclusive focus
on the rates of solar PV deployment [11]. They found that “the influential IEA scenar-
ios [which] have conservative projections for solar PV growth and offer little analysis of
emerging energy technologies”, concluding that the WEO projections for solar PV consis-
tently underestimated the actual implementation rates. In this article we have chosen to
focus instead on the percentage of electricity generated from renewable technologies as
a proxy indicator for the transition to low carbon energy systems, keeping in mind the
crucial role that renewable electricity is widely expected to have in deep decarbonization
scenarios [16–21].
Similar conclusions were reached by Metayer et al. who noted that the IEA assumed a
linear growth trend for solar and wind technologies, whereas historical data clearly favored
a long-term exponential growth rate for new renewable technologies [22]. These authors
performed the most comprehensive analysis of WEO projections that we were able to find
in the literature, by processing data from 15 different reports published between 1994
and 2014, and examining trends for total primary energy demand (TPED) for renewable
technologies, such as solar PV, electricity demand, and nuclear energy. However, this 2015
work did not include any projections published after the Paris Agreement was approved.
We believe that it is extremely important to update this assessment in view of more recent
WEOs and the urgent need for more stringent emission reduction goals, and to discuss
how the variation in the projections compares with the targets for greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in 2030, as we do in this work.
In this context, several reports from NGOs and public advocacy groups have in
recent years been quite critical of the IEA projections, particularly in relation to its likely
overestimation of fossil fuel demand and underestimation of the observed rate of renewable
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energy implementation. We note in particular the excellent work of the Carbon Tracker
Initiative which played a major role in establishing and widely publicizing the concept
of the “carbon bubble” (or “unburnable” fossil fuel assets) starting from their first 2011
report [23]. One particular milestone was their 2017 report, which convincingly argued
that the potential for energy demand reduction might be systematically underestimated by
the baseline scenarios from the IEA, BP, ExxonMobil, and other international agencies and
large companies [24]. In the present work we go one step further by directly comparing the
2030 maximum variations for energy sector CO2 emissions found in the WEO reports, with
the emissions gap between the projections and the climate mitigation targets compatible
with a global warming of less than 2 ◦C.
Since the Paris Agreement (PA) was adopted in December 2015 [25], several authors
have analyzed the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) submitted by most of the
196 countries which are part of the Agreement [26–29], with particular reference to the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report [30]. All these
different analyses concur that the current NDCs are not enough to comply with the PA
targets, with further ambition urgently required. Thus, in this work we compare the WEO
projections for CO2 emissions from the energy sector with the emission targets for 2030 for
six of the eight regions defined (world and Africa were not considered, for methodological
reasons). We also focus on a precise time interval of 12 years (2006–2018), equal to the
time interval separating 2018 (the date of the last WEO report analyzed in this work) from
2030. Our main research question is to assess whether the maximum variation in the
different projections is comparable with the (relative) gap between the emissions expected
in 2030 and the reduction levels needed to avoid 2 ◦C average global heating, compared to
pre-industrial levels. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that such an analysis
has been carried out.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Data and Regions Considered
Our analysis focused on energy projections made for the years 2010, 2020, 2030, and
2040, based on data published by the IEA in its WEO reports [31–43]. We chose to only
include projections starting from 1994, since before that date there were only two WEO
reports, one in 1977 and another in 1982. The reports analyzed, as well as the years they
cover, are listed in Table 1. The regions and countries considered in this analysis are the
world, OECD, OECD Europe, OECD North America, China, India, Russia, and Africa (see
Table A1). For each of these regions we quantified the variations in thirteen editions of
the WEO reports (Table 1) focusing on the key indicators: TPED, CO2 emissions from the
energy sector, and the percentage of RES electricity.
For the WEO reports covering the period between 1994 and 2008, we considered
the IEA “Reference” Scenario (also called “Capacity Constraints” in the 1996 edition [32]
and “Business as Usual” (BAU) in 1998 [33]). Starting from 2010 this was replaced with a
“Current Policies” Scenario (Table 1). Two extra scenarios also introduced in 2010, but not
considered in the present work, are “New Policies” and “450”. Instead, we deliberately
chose to focus on the more conservative scenarios in each WEO edition (Reference/Current
Policies). The reason for this choice is that these scenarios and their respective projections
are widely regarded as the “gold standard of energy analysis” and are extremely influential
in terms of public perception and policy making [3,11,12,22,23]. We note that the Current
Policies Scenario does not yet include the commitments already made by countries in the
form of the NDCs. What it does assess is, taking the WEO 2018 as an example, “the impact
of those policies and measures that are firmly enshrined in legislation as of mid-2018” [38].
Details about the “World Energy Model” which generates these projections can be found in
the IEA documentation [44]. The exact definition for the 8 regional groupings can be found
in Appendix A. Moreover, for a general economic overview of the considered regions and
several key energy indicators, see Appendix B.
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Table 1. List of IEA WEO reports analyzed in this paper.
Publication Year Years for Which Data orProjections Are Given IEA Scenario
1994 [31] 1971 *, 1991 *, 2000, 2010
“Reference” Scenario
1996 [32] 1971 *, 1993 *, 2000, 2010
1998 [33] 1971 *, 1990 *, 1995 *, 2010, 2020
2000 [34] 1971 *, 1997 *, 2010, 2020
2002 [35] 1971 *, 2000 *, 2010, 2020, 2030
2004 [36] 1971 *, 2002 *, 2010, 2020, 2030
2006 [37] 1990 *, 2004 *, 2015, 2030
2008 [38] 1990 *, 2006 *, 2015, 2020, 2025, 2030
2010 [39] 2020, 2030, 2035
“Current Policies” Scenario
2012 [40] 2020, 2030, 2035
2015 [41] 2020, 2030, 2040
2017 [42] 2025, 2030, 2040
2018 [43] 2025 2030, 2040
* Historical data, per time of publication.
2.2. Key Indicators and Methods
In this work, we developed an approach to assess the variation within the IEA WEO
projections, by considering a two-step approach. In Section 3.1 we look at some of the
projections made for the year 2010 from six different WEO reports in order to assess how
close they were to what was actually observed, and in which areas these projections were
further off. In Section 3.2 we extend this to also cover projections made for future years,
with an emphasis on 2030 and 2040. Finally, in Section 3.3 we zoom in on the year 2030
and compare the projections made by different WEOs for CO2 emissions from the energy
sector with the current NDCs for that year. We thus linked the projections made for past
years with the projections for the future and tried to translate those findings into possible
implications for the uncertainty of future projections for 2030 (in particular) and 2040.
The three key indicators used in this exercise were TPED, CO2 emissions from the
energy sector, and the total consumption of electricity (in Section 3.1) or percentage of elec-
tricity generated from renewable sources (in Section 3.2). We believe that these indicators
can give us an overall picture of how energy systems are evolving. They have also been
utilized in recent similar studies. As an example, the authors of [3] looked at global and
regional total primary energy supply and total final energy consumption, comparing per
capita and per GDP projections (also from several WEO reports) with historical values.
As for the role of electricity, it is now widely acknowledged that it must play a crucial
role in any decarbonization strategy [16,18,21,45,46]. If, until recently, the main focus
was on electrification, regardless of the source of electricity, in order to increase access to
energy [17], it is becoming increasingly clear that, in order to fulfil the Paris Agreement
goals, all newly installed electricity (and, progressively, also the substitution of existing
fossil fuel power plants) will have to come from renewable sources [16,45,46].
3. Results
3.1. Variation in Projections between 1994 and 2010
In this section we compare some of the assumptions underlying energy projections
made in the WEO reports for the years between 1994 and 2010 [31–36], such as population
and GDP growth, with the historical variations de facto observed. The choice of 1994
and 2010 for the time interval stemmed from the fact that the 1994 WEO is the first WEO
considered in this work (Table 1), and 2010 is the one for which more projections are
available (a total of six) from the list of WEO reports considered (Table 1).
Table 2 shows a comparison for the period 1994–2010 between the historical rate of
growth (left columns) in both population and GDP per purchasing power parity (PPP) in
2010 and in USD billion, and the average (right columns) of all the variations projected by
those six WEO reports. As an example, the WEO average projections for world population
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growth in 2010 were aligned with the historical value (23%), whereas for GDP the WEO
projections tended to slightly underestimate economic growth (actual value was the same
as the maximum found in all projections). In the case of Africa, China, and India, even
the maximum WEO projections for economic growth were all below what was actually
observed, something which we discuss in the next section. We note however that no
comparable mismatch occurred for population growth projections, with historical values
falling next to the average for projections for these same three regions.
Table 2. Historical population (blue) and GDP (red) growth between 1994 and 2010, compared with the average of WEO
projections made for 2010 between 1994 and 2004.
Region
Historical Variation
‘94–’10 Average of WEO Projections for 2010
Population GDP PPP (USDBillion in 2010) Population
GDP PPP (USD
Billion in 2010)
World 23% 79% 23% 65%
OECD 12% 43% 8% 44%
OECD Europe 7% 40% 3% 42%
OECD N. America 20% 49% 14% 46%
China 12% 358% 15% 169%
India 31% 198% 28% 118%
Russia −4% 66% −7% 73%
Africa 49% 106% 46% 74%
Table 3 shows the results of a similar analysis, but this time for the variation observed
(left) and projected (right) by the same six WEO editions for TPED, CO2 emissions from
the energy sector, and the total consumption of electricity. Overall, we see a fairly good
agreement between the projections for TPED, CO2 emissions, and the actual historical
variations, although China is again an outlier. However, a clear trend can be seen in terms
of the projections for total electricity. In all regions except for China, the historical variation
stayed below the minimum values (not shown here) projected in the six WEO reports.
In Section 3.2.3 we will come back to this fact when discussing the share of renewable
electricity projected by the Reference Scenario of the WEOs. In the case of China, the
variation in the total consumption of electricity (354%) was much larger than even the
maximum WEO projections.
Table 3. Historical growth of TPED (blue), CO2 emissions from energy (pink), and the total electricity consumption (green)
between 1994 and 2010 compared with the average of WEO projections made for 2010.
Region
Historical Variation
‘94–’10 Average of WEO Projections for 2010
TPED CO2 Emissions(from Energy) Total ELC TPED
CO2 Emissions
(from Energy) Total ELC
World 43% 47% 68% 35% 44% 73%
OECD 14% 9% 32% 17% 19% 41%
OECD Europe 12% 0% 31% 17% 16% 42%
OECD N. America 11% 10% 27% 19% 23% 41%
China 161% 200% 354% 62% 84% 172%
India 99% 142% 145% 91% 145% 209%
Russia 5% −4% 19% 7% 8% 35%
Africa 64% 80% 87% 35% 96% 114%
In order to analyse such trends, we then measured the variations in these same three
indicators (from Table 3), in per capita (Table 4) and per GDP (Table 5) terms. These two
sets of data thus combine the data shown in Tables 2 and 3, regarding what the six different
WEO reports were projecting in their Reference Scenario for five variables: population,
GDP, TPED, CO2 emissions, and total consumption of electricity.
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Table 4. Per capita variations of historical TPED (blue), CO2 emissions from energy (pink), and total electricity consumption








(from Energy) Total ELC
TPED CO2 Emissions(from Energy) Total ELC
Avg Avg Avg
World 16% 19% 36% 10% 17% 41%
OECD 1% −3% 17% 10% 11% 31%
OECD Europe 5% −6% 23% 14% 12% 38%
OECD N. America −7% −8% 6% 4% 8% 23%
China 132% 167% 305% 41% 60% 138%
India 53% 85% 87% 50% 90% 140%
Russia 9% −1% 24% 16% 17% 45%
Africa 10% 21% 25% −7% 34% 47%
Table 5. Economic intensity (per USD thousand in 2010) of TPED (blue), CO2 emissions from energy (pink, and total
electricity consumption (green) for 1994–2010 (left), compared with the average of WEO projections for the year 2010 (right).
Region
Historical Variation ‘94–’10
(per USD 1000 in 2010)
Average of WEO Projections for 2010
(per USD 1000 in 2010)





USD 1000 in 2010
Total ELC/ USD
1000 in 2010
World −20% −18% −6% −18% −12% −10%
OECD −21% −24% −8% −18% −17% −16%
OECD Europe −20% −28% −7% −17% −18% −14%
OECD N. America −26% −26% −15% −19% −16% −17%
China −43% −35% −1% −37% −30% −9%
India −33% −19% −18% −11% 13% 22%
Russia −37% −42% −29% −37% −36% −32%
Africa −20% −13% −10% −21% 13% 6%
From Table 4 we see that almost the same exact trends observed in Table 3 are on
display. In particular, the projections for the variation in the total electricity consumption
per capita (green, right) are still above the historical variation in all regions, except for the
case of China. Interestingly, per capita CO2 emissions from the energy sector fell in the
three OECD regions whereas the WEO reports had projected they would grow, a trend also
seen in Table 3.
When we turn to variations for the same key indicators, but in terms of economic
intensity, shown in Table 5, all the averages of the WEO projections for TPED (blue, right)
are now very close to the historical variation, except for the case of India. The same is true
for CO2 emissions (pink). Once again, the case of China is of particular interest. Although
its actual growth in TPED had been larger than all projections (either in absolute terms,
Table 3, or per capita, Table 4), we now see that the historical variation (−35%) is very close
to the average of the projections (−30%). Even though GDP growth in the 1994–2010 period
widely surpassed all WEO projections (Table 2), as did growth in the three key indicators
considered (Table 3), dividing these values cancels the variations. This could not happen in
the case of per capita indicators (Table 4) because the projections for population growth in
China were very close to the historical variation (Table 2).
3.2. Variation in Projections from 1990 to 2040
We now turn to the variations observed in the IEA projections up to 2040. In this
section we present the maximum variations found in over two and a half decades of WEO
projections of TPED, CO2 emissions from the energy sector, and the percentage of RES
Sustainability 2021, 13, 7432 7 of 27
electricity for the regions considered in this work (see Tables 1 and A1). This analysis is
then followed by a comparison with the variations encountered and the 2030 NDCs, in
order to assess if the variations in energy projections and their associated emissions might
be comparable to the gap between the current NDCs and the Paris Agreement goals. As
discussed in previous sections, we should keep in mind that the regions considered had
very different economic and social trajectories in the past decades.
3.2.1. TPED
In Figure 1 we show the values for TPED in GWh for the regions chosen for this
analysis for the IEA “Reference” [31–38] and “Current Policies” [39–43] scenarios, for the
years between 1990 and 2040. Some general features can be readily identified related to
major historical events, including: the fall of the Soviet Union, which greatly influenced
Russia’s TPED, leading to a decrease of about 35% between 1990 and 1997; the financial
crisis of 2008–2009, which more clearly affected the OECD (and in particular Europe) than
the rest of the world (TPED fell 3.3% in OECD Europe between 2008 and 2013, compared
to a decrease of only 1.8% for the whole of OECD and an increase in Chinese TPED of
42.5% for the same period); or the spectacular rise in China’s TPED by 335% between
1997 and 2013, which seemed to have caught modelers by surprise, as so often is the case
with events of such magnitude [4].
In this respect, it is interesting to observe (Figure 1e) that in 2004 the IEA was predicting
a value of TPED for China in 2030 which was reached as early as 2010 (whilst the value of
TPED projected in 2004 for China in 2010 ended up being roughly half of the actual value).
There was also an important change in the accounting methods of the WEO in 2000, which
began to also include “Combustible Renewables and Waste” in TPED, which explains the
large shift in values seen in the case of India and Africa (Figure 1f,h).
In Figure 2 we quantified the maximum relative variations (in percentage) found in
these different TPED projections, made for the years 2010, 2020, 2030, and 2040, in reports
from three different (and increasingly shorter) time intervals: 1994–2018, 2006–2018, and
2015–2018, including a total of 13, 7, and 3 WEO sets of projections, respectively (Table 1).
As expected, the magnitude of the variations decreases with time (since different projections
made closer in time and using similar assumptions will usually—minus some major
geopolitical or economic turmoil—be more in accordance). But we note that there can be
quite significant differences in these projections, as pointed out in previous research(e.g., the
authors in [4,6,47]). As an example, the projections for TPED in the OECD for the year
2030 went from 83 GWh in 2002 to 63 GWh in 2017 and 2018, a difference of more than
24%. For China, India, and Africa we see even larger variations over a similar time period
(although in an opposite direction). This is partially because of much higher growth rates
registered in these regions compared to more developed economies (as seen in Table A2, last
column), although some issues with the accuracy of data gathering may also be involved.
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3.2.2. CO2 Emissions from the Energy Sector 
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an example, if we focus on the year 2030, the maximum variations found for TPED pro-
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−24%, −21%, −26%, 80%, 59%, −18%, and 32%. For CO2 emissions (Figure 4a) they are −8%, 
−35%, −32%, −38%, 78%, 88%, −33%, and −38%, so of slightly larger absolute magnitude in 
all cases, except for China. As was the case for TPED, China and India again present 
greater variations overall in the projections, particularly for 2030. The large relative vari-
ation observed for the region of Europe in recent projections for 2030 and 2040 (Figure 4c) 
again merely reflects the fact that the number of countries included in that definition 





Figure 2. Maximum relative variation (in percentage) among the TPED projections for the time
intervals (from top to bottom): (a) 1994–2018, (b) 2006–2018, (c) 2015–2018, with respect to the years
2010, 2020, 2030, and 2040. A positive value indicates a correction made upwards, negative values
mark downward variations.
Overall, the global projections (world) present smaller variations amongst the different
WEO editions (ranging from only −2% for 2040 to 9% for 2010 projections), as expected
from Figure 1, but these can mask much larger differences in the projections for individual
countries or regions. Moreover, the year for which more projections are considered (nine)
is 2030 (see Table 1). The large (relative to other regi ns) incr ase in variation within the
projections made in 2015–2018 for Europe (Figure 2c) s partly the consequence of the large
change that took place in th WEO i 2017 for that regional definition (Table A1). This
spike is also observed in Figure 4c, f r the only reason that many more countries were
included in that regional definition, starting from 2017.
3.2.2. CO2 Emissions from the Energy Sector
Figure 3 shows an analysis similar to the one shown in Figure 1, but this time for CO2
emissions (given in millions of tonnes) from the energy sector, by far the largest source
of GHG emissions globally [18]. The projections are given for years between 1990 and
2040. There is a strong correlation with the results shown in both Figures 1 and 3, but with
slightly larger (maximum) variations amongst the projections for the latter (Figure 4). As an
example, if we focus on the year 2030, the maximum variations found for TPED projections
for the eight regions, between 1994 and 2018 (Figure 2a) are, respectively: 7%, −24%, −21%,
−26%, 80%, 59%, −18%, and 32%. For CO2 emissions (Figure 4a) they are −8%, −35%,
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−32%, −38%, 78%, 88%, −33%, and −38%, so of slightly larger absolute magnitude in all
cases, except for China. As was the case for TPED, China and India again present greater
variations overall in the projections, particularly for 2030. The large relative variation
observed for the region of Europe in recent projections for 2030 and 2040 (Figure 4c) again
merely reflects the fact that the number of countries included in that definition greatly
increased in the 2017 WEO report.
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technological changes, the variations found between different TPEDand CO2 projections 
can be partly explained by the rate of economic growth observed during the same period. 
However, we can see from Table 2 that the GDP growth for these two countries was highly 
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Regarding the differences found between the projections for China and India (par-
ticularly for Figures 2a and 4a) and the other regions considered in this work, Table A2
already provides some indication as to why that might be. Namely, between 1990 and 2013,
whereas Africa only grew slightly above the world average (138% vs. 115%) in terms of
GDP (measured in PPP), Chi a a d India grew by a staggering 836% and 325%, respec-
tively. It is to b expe ted that such large rat s of growth would inevitably introduce large
variations in in-between projections. It seems obvious that apart from highly disruptive
technological changes, the variations found between different TPEDand CO2 projections
can be partly explained by the rate of economic growth observed during the same period.
However, we can see from Table 2 that the GDP growth for these two countries was highly
underestimated, thus influencing the accurateness of all other related economic projections.
3.2.3. Generated RES Electricity
Finally, in Figures 5 and 6 we present a similar analysis, but this time for the share of
the electricity generated from RES between 1971 and 2040. We chose to look at generated
electricity (i.e., TWh) instead of installed capacity, since the latter may not reflect issues
related to intermittency and distribution (i.e., installed sources which may not yet be
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connected to the electrical grid). The definition of “renewable” used in this instance,
following the IEA WEO convention, considers all sources of electricity not generated using
either coal, gas, oil or nuclear, and thus also including hydro.
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One interesting aspect shown in Figure 5 is the fact that for many regions of the 
world, such as North America, India, and Africa, the share of renewable electricity was 
greater in 1971 than in 2015 (and that is why we choose to show the 1971 values in this 
case, and not in Figures 1 and 3). This can be easily explained by the very large global 
share of hydroelectricity in energy systems, which has decreased in recent years. As an 
example, in 1971 46% of the electricity generated in India was from hydro, from a total of 
61 TWh [38]). In 2013 this value had increased by a factor of almost 20 to 1193 TWh, but 
the share of hydro was now only 12%, with other renewable sources (bioenergy, wind, 
and solar PV) adding another 5% (equivalent to 60 TWh) [41]. During that period, other 
non-RES sources greatly increased their share in electricity generation in India, with the 
share of coal rising from 44% in 1971 to 73% in 2013 [36]. A similar evolution occurred in 
Africa and China. The case of OECD Europe is slightly different, particularly due to the 
very large increase in RES electricity (particularly wind and solar PV) in the last two dec-
ades. In this case, the share of non-hydro RES sources in electricity generation increased 
from less than 1% in 1971 to 16% in 2015, with another 16% coming from hydro [36,42]. 
However, this dependency on hydropower is also a dire warning of how much energy 
security in modern societies is dependent on the level of precipitation, particularly in the 
context of an increasingly harsh climate change impact on river flows [48]. 
Another remarkable feature seen in Figure 5 is that the percentage of renewable elec-
tricity projected for 2020 in the 2000 WEO was already surpassed, in all the eight regions 
considered, a few years before 2010. (Even though some regions, such as Russia and India 
have seen a slight decrease of this percentage in recent years, due to the growth of natural 
gas and coal, respectively, in electricity generation.) This has been remarked on by several 
Figure 6. Maximum relative variation (in percentage) among the fr cti f r t l ctricity, shown in Figure 5, for
the time intervals (from top to botto ): (a) 1994–2018, (b) 2006–2018, (c) 2015–2018, with respect to the years 2010, 2020,
2030, and 2040. The same conventions apply as in Figures 2 and 4.
One interesting aspect s i Figure 5 is the fact that for many regions f the world,
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not i Figures 1 and 3). This can be e sily explain d by the very large global share of
hydroelectricity in energy systems, which has decrease in recent years. As an example, in
1971 46% of the electricity generated in India was from hydro, from a total of 61 TWh [38]).
In 2013 this value had increased by a factor of almost 20 to 1193 TWh, but the share of hydro
was now only 12%, with other renewable sourc s (bioenergy, wind, and solar PV) adding
anothe 5% (equivalent to 60 TWh) [41]. During that period, other non-RES sources greatly
i creased their share in electricity g neration in India, with the share of coal rising from
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44% in 1971 to 73% in 2013 [36]. A similar evolution occurred in Africa and China. The
case of OECD Europe is slightly different, particularly due to the very large increase in RES
electricity (particularly wind and solar PV) in the last two decades. In this case, the share
of non-hydro RES sources in electricity generation increased from less than 1% in 1971 to
16% in 2015, with another 16% coming from hydro [36,42]. However, this dependency on
hydropower is also a dire warning of how much energy security in modern societies is
dependent on the level of precipitation, particularly in the context of an increasingly harsh
climate change impact on river flows [48].
Another remarkable feature seen in Figure 5 is that the percentage of renewable
electricity projected for 2020 in the 2000 WEO was already surpassed, in all the eight
regions considered, a few years before 2010. (Even though some regions, such as Russia
and India have seen a slight decrease of this percentage in recent years, due to the growth
of natural gas and coal, respectively, in electricity generation.) This has been remarked
on by several authors and highlights the fact that the IEA reference scenarios have been
profoundly conservative and have systematically failed to capture the astonishing pace of
renewable energy implementation in recent years [11,49]. It is also interesting to compare
these results with Table 3, where we see that the amount of total electricity consumption
for all eight regions, with the exception of China, between 1994 and 2010 was lower than
the minimum range of WEO projections. Crossing that information with the data shown
in Figures 5 and 6 we thus conclude that there was a very large projection, by the WEO
reports during that period, of the growth in electricity consumption from non-renewable
sources (fossil fuels and nuclear power) that never materialized.
Also, as is clearly seen from Figure 6, the level of maximum variation in the projections
for RES electricity is now much greater than it was for CO2 emissions from the energy
sector (Figure 4) or for TPED projections (Figure 2), as evidenced by the change in the
vertical scale. This also indicates that there appears to be much less variation in the
expected evolution of populations and the associated energy demand patterns than on the
type of technologies that will supply that demand, as some of the analysis in Section 3.1
alreadyshowed. Besides the magnitude of the variations, these are all (for 2020, 2030, and
2040) now in a positive direction (with only a small exception for a −4% cut in projections
for Russia, introduced by the 2018 WEO), indicating successive upwards corrections in
successive WEO editions for all eight regions considered. To clarify this point, we can see
that the maximum variation in global (world) projections for 2030 is 75%, only falling to
20% in recent years (when comparing Figure 6a with Figure 6c).
3.3. Implications for the NDCs
Since the 1970s, energy projections have become increasingly more relevant, not
only for energy policy goals (particularly energy security and economic growth), but also
for supporting climate policy and the much-needed energy transition to a low carbon
system. According to the latest IPCC assessment: “In 2010, the energy supply sector was
responsible for approximately 35% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions” [18], by far
the largest contributor to GHG emissions. In a prominent article it is argued that the
world has roughly three years (starting in 2017) in order to achieve an absolute GHG
emissions peak, otherwise the cost of achieving the 2 ◦C goal becomes increasingly (and
prohibitively) steep [45]. In another influential paper, the authors propose that carbon
dioxide anthropogenic emissions be halved every decade, once again with an absolute
peak being achieved no later than 2020 [46].
The most recent UNEP Emissions Gap Report found a global gap of 12 GtCO2e
(conditional) and 15 GtCO2e (unconditional) between the current NDCs and the target
GHG emissions level in 2030. This is for an emissions’ level still compatible with a greater
than 66% chance of avoiding a 2 ◦C warming by 2100 [30]. This would in turn imply
reducing total GHG emissions from an expected (under conditional NDCs) level of 56
GtCO2e to just 41 GtCO2e (median estimate, in a range of 39–46 GtCO2e), i.e., a global
reduction of 27% [30].
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If we now compare this variation with the WEO projections for CO2 emissions from
the energy sector in 2030, we see that it is either smaller or of a similar magnitude than the
maximum variation found for the 2030 projections reported in Figure 4a,b for all regions
except “world” (in both Figures) and China (in Figure 4b, which shows a variation of 15%).
So, for the regions OECD, OECD Europe, and OECD North America there are variations in
the projected CO2 emissions for 2030 of −35%, −32%, and −38%, respectively, for the WEO
reports considered between 1994 and 2018 (Figure 4a). The variations are all in the same
direction, i.e., in decreasing the projected value in subsequent years. We should again point
out that in the WEO Current Policies Scenario, NDCs commitments are still not accounted
for. This can in turn be compared with some of the NDCs, e.g., the EU-28 goal of reducing
GHG emissions in 2030 by 40% from 1990 levels (recently increased from a 50% target to a
55% target), the commitment by the USA of reducing GHG emissions by 26–28% in 2025
compared to 2005 levels, or Canada’s commitment of a 30% reduction in GHG emission by
2030 compared to 2005 [21,23–25]. Globally, the IEA and the WEO variations of world CO2
projections have a much lower magnitude (−8% for 2030, Figure 4a,b), but this can hide
very large regional variations in past projections, as shown in the previous section.
In order to furthercompare these variations, we analyzed several NDCs directly and
computed the GHG emissions that they entail for 2030. Table 6 shows the countries whose
NDCs were assessed, a very short summary of their goals, and the methodology used to
estimate their expected 2030 level of GHG emissions. (In the case of non-ratification of the
PA, as per the case of Turkey, these are instead called Intended NDCs. Russia ratified the
Agreement in October 2019). For this exercise, no LULUCF contributions were considered.
For the case of the USA, China, and India we used the values calculated by the authors
in [50] for 2030, assuming an SSP2 “middle of the road” scenario [51]. This stemmed
from the fact that the USA NDCs only refer to 2025 and not 2030 (for that country, the
authors in [50] assumed a linear extrapolation of emissions reduction rates for the period
2025–2030), and that both China and India refer to the carbon intensity of GDP.
Table 6. List of countries and regions whose NDCs were considered with a short summary of the NDCs relating to GHG
direct emissions only (LULUCF not accounted for), and the methodology used for estimating GHG emissions in 2030.
Region or Country Summary of NDCs Methodology Mt CO2e in 2030
EU-28 40% GHG reduction in 2030,compared to 1990 1990 emissions, UNFCCC database 3432
Iceland 40% GHG reduction in 2030,compared to 1990 1990 emissions, UNFCCC database 2.101
Norway 40% GHG reduction in 2030,compared to 1990 1990 emissions, UNFCCC database 31.05
Switzerland 50% GHG reduction in 2030,compared to 1990 1990 emissions, UNFCCC database 22.3
Turkey * Reduction of up to 21% of GHGemissions from BAU by 2030
BAU estimation in INDCs
(not ratified yet) 928
USA Reduce GHG emissions by 26–28%below its 2005 level in 2025 assuming linear rate [50] 4200–4400
Canada Reduce GHG emissions by 30%below 2005 levels by 2030 2005 emissions, UNFCCC database 512
Mexico Reduce GHG emissions by 22–36%below BAU of 973 Mt. BAU is given in NDCs 623–759
Australia
Economy-wide target to reduce
GHG emissions by 26–28% below
2005 levels by 2030
2005 emissions, UNFCCC database 402–414
Japan reduction of 26% by fiscal year (FY)2030 compared to FY 2013 2013 emissions from NDCs 771
New Zealand reduce GHG emissions to 30%below 2005 levels by 2030 2005 emissions, UNFCCC database 57.8
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Table 6. Cont.
Region or Country Summary of NDCs Methodology Mt CO2e in 2030
Republic of Korea Emission reduction by 37% fromBAU level by 2030 BAU estimation given in NDCs 536
China
Peak emissions before 2030 + Lower
CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by
60–65% from 2005 level
assuming SSP2 [50] 15900–17600
India
Reduction in emissions intensity of
GDP by 33–35% from 2005 levels
by 2030
assuming SSP2 [50] 6900–7100
Russia Limiting anthropogenic GHG to70–75% of 1990 levels by 2030
1990 emissions, UNFCCC database
(still INDCs) 1757–1887
* Indicates Intended NDCs.
The values for GHG emissions in 2030 implied by these NDCs are shown in Figure 7
for six different regions (OECD, OECD Europe, OECD North America, China, India,
and Russia), assuming the ranges shown on Table 6, and were compared with the CO2
emissions from the energy sector estimated in the WEO reports of 2006, 2010, 2015, 2017,
and 2018.The time interval between the first and last of these five WEO reports is equal to
that between 2018 and 2030. We are perfectly aware of comparing different things in this
exercise. More specifically, the WEO projections considered here do not account for other
non-CO2 GHG gases, which would certainly inflate total GHG emissions, and LULUCF is
also not accounted. Still, we see that for most regions the NDCs values are comparable with
the IEA “Reference” (2006) and “Current Policies” (2010, 2015, 2017, 2018) scenarios. As an
example, for the whole of the OECD region, the WEO in 2006 and 2010 was still projecting
CO2 emission levels for the energy sector which were superior to the total value of the GHG
emissions (average between minimum and maximum range) these regions committed
to for 2030 (Figure 7). Only in the case of China and India were the NDCs estimations
considerably higher than the CO2 emissions from the energy sector only projected by the
WEO reports between 2006 and 2018.
For comparison, we also considered the maximum variation (“maxVar”) found for
the CO2 emissions from the energy sector in 2030, between the considered set of (seven)
2006–2018 WEO reports (Figure 4, middle row). Figure 7 shows the result of adding and
subtracting these variations to the IEA WEO 2018 projections (the most recent ones) for
2030. We found that the CO2 emission projections (without any NDCs commitments made
by countries, which in the WEO reports are part of the “New Policies” Scenario, and
thus are not considered here) are thus well within the range of the NDCs, except in the
case of China. The reason for this can be explained by the fact that since 2006 the WEO
projections for CO2 emissions have varied very little. For India, adding this maximum
variation to the WEO 2017 values puts it very close to the average NDCs estimation. It
should be noted that these two regions have very high levels of uncertainty regarding
future developments [29,50]. In the case of Russia, its INDCs commitment is by all accounts
fairly unambitious, due to the very high level of their GHG baseline emissions in 1990, and
so it is hard to conclude much from this comparison.
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Figure 7. WEO projections (2006, 2010, 2015, 2017, and 2018) for CO2 emissions for the energy sector
in 2030 and the NDC ranges (minimum and maximum) for the proposed GHG emissions in 2030, for
6 different regions. The label “maxVar” indicates the magnitude of the maximum variation found
between the projections for these regions (Figure 4b). These are 31%, 30%, 35%, 15%, 66%, and
25%, respectively. The variations were then subtracted and added to the respective WEO 2018 CO2
emissions projection for 2030, for comparison.
Thus, we find that the answer to the initial question is clearly affirmative, i.e., the
magnitude of the variations found in the WEO projections for CO2 (the main GHG) emis-
sions from the energy sector for the six different regions shown in Figure 7 is indeed higher
or equal to the global gap of 27% between current NDCs and the 2 ◦C Paris Agreement
target for 2030, except in the case of China. However, we should also note the different
direction in which these variations occurred, which was negative for the case of OECD,
OECD Europe, OECD North America, and Russia (implying a downward correction in
emission projections), but positive in the case of China and India, implying an upwards
correction (Figure 4b).
4. Discussion
Our analysis of TPED, CO2 emissions from the energy sector and the percentage of
the RES electricity projections in thirteen IEA World Energy Outlook reports published
between 1994 and 2018 has revealed some underlying trends. In particular, towards
slightly overestimating TPED (and subsequent CO2 emissions) for some regions, as well as
systematically underestimating the rate of implementation of renewable energy sources.
These are briefly summarized in Table 7.
Sustainability 2021, 13, 7432 18 of 27
Table 7. Main summary of the results for the 8 regions and the 3 main variables analyzed in Section 3.2, as regards: (i) differ-
ence between projections and observed values (small variations, significant variations; underestimated, overestimated);
(ii) future trends for 2040 (reduction, constant, small growth, large growth); and (iii) recent changes to projected trends for
2030 and 2040 (revised downwards, revised upwards).





















































• large growth projected
• revised downwards
• significant variations
• high growth projected
• revised downwards
• overestimated




• small growth projected
• revised upwards;
• overestimated
• small growth projected
• revised downwards
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• high growth projected
• revised upwards
• underestimated
• high growth projected
• revised upwards
As discussed in previous work (e.g., the authors in [4,5,9,52,53]), one possible explana-
tion for this discrepancy is that the legacy models for forecasting energy demand and new
technology implementation are likely ill-suited for dealing with disruptive events or very
fast transitions, including the kind of accelerated transition that is now required worldwide
in order to drastically reduce GHG emissions. This mismatch might be thrown into sharper
focus in a situation where demand for global climate action spreads worldwide and over-
comes most short-term economic considerations, forcing governments and companies into
an accelerated path of emissions reduction. One possible way to improve energy systems
modeling is by promoting a wider adoption of agent-based modeling of energy systems
and energy transitions [54–56], in combination with insights from behavioral science and a
mature view of real-life stakeholder decision processes [53].
In terms of other methodological aspects which could be driving these results, we
believe one major issue is very likely: the general assumption of persistent high GDP
growth rates, both in global terms, as well as for specific regions of the world, in the
foreseeable future, as discussed by previous authors, thus also driving a high growth of
TPED [24]. As an example, in the 2018 description of the underlying simulation model for
the WEO scenarios, we can read that “In WEO-2018, world gross domestic product (GDP)
is expected to grow on average by 3.4% per year over the projection period (2017–2040)
That rate is slower than past trends (3.6% in 2000–2017)” [44]. It could be argued that such
growth rates might be very hard to maintain in that 23-year period, particularly at a time
of (expected) increasing commodity shortages, higher environmental impacts, and more
extreme weather events. Moreover, the regions of the world whose economic growth will
be leading world GDP growth in the period 2017–2040 are also in many cases the same
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regions which will feel the worse impact of climate change, e.g., Africa, the Middle East,
and Asia Pacific. For these regions, the projected GDP growth rates are 4.3%, 3.4%, and
4.5%, respectively, for that period in the central WEO scenario of 2018 [44].
Several NDCs (e.g., for Mexico, Republic of Korea, Turkey) are made in relation to
so-called business-as-usual (BAU) scenarios, where typically very high economic growth
is assumed, with a corresponding increase in energy demand and emissions. Oftentimes,
these BAU scenarios are based on assumptions stemming from relevant and recognized
sources for energy policy and analysis, which include the IEA’s WEO. As mentioned by
other authors, we argue that this can in turn create a kind of “self-fulfilling prophecy” [9,11],
which can work either in the direction of more sustainable energy systems or in an opposite
direction [53].
Another example of possible methodological biases are the assumptions behind fossil
fuel subsidies, which in the World Energy Model (WEM) documentation [44] are also
expected to continue to exist in the foreseeable future, something which is widely seen
as incompatible with the Paris Agreement goals [25]. Carbon prices are also relevant to
thisdiscussion, being expected to be USD 22 per tonne in the IEA Current Policies Scenario
and USD 25 in the New Policies Scenario by 2025, for the European Union [44]. However, in
the last three quarters of 2019, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) carbon price never
fell below EUR 21 per tonne, and thus was already consistently trading higher for most of
the time than the price considered in the WEM only for 2025. More incredibly, the EUR
50 per tonne threshold was breached in May 2021 (URL: https://ember-climate.org/data/
carbon-price-viewer/ (accessed on 31 May 2021)). This could in turn affect the calculations
in terms of which power plants are still profitable, in particular coal and natural gas ones,
drastically reducing their expected lifetime [24,57].
5. Conclusions
Whilst the IEA projections are seen to be fairly consistent on a global scale (particularly
for TPED and CO2 emissions from the energy sector), this consistency can actually mask
very large regional variations. Thus, we found the maximum variation in CO2 projections
(from the energy sector) from the period 2006–2018 to be comparable to the additional GHG
emissions reductions needed to close the gap between current NDCs and the 2030 emission
targets. More concretely, the current (global) gap between existing NDCs and the reduction
in GHG emissions needed to comply with the Paris Agreement goal of warming below
2 ◦C was recently estimated at 15 GtCO2e, or 27% of 2030 GHG emissions [30]. In this
analysis we found variations of −31%, −30%, and −34%, for the OECD, OECD Europe,
and OECD North America regions, respectively, in CO2 emissions from the energy sector
projected for 2030 by different WEOs published in the last twelve years (Figure 4b). For
China, India, and Africa these values were +15%, +66%, and −28%, respectively, for the
same time interval, albeit in a different direction for the first two countries.
Thus, when we directly compared the estimated NDCs with the values of CO2 emis-
sions (from the energy sector) projected by the IEA for 2030 (Figure 7), we found that for
four of the regions analyzed (OECD, OECD Europe, OECD North America, and Russia),
the values were very similar. When taking into account the maximum variation observed
in projections made over a period of 12 years, then even in the case of India, the NDCs
commitments fell within the range of recent WEO variations or corrections, albeit at the
higher end of the spectrum. This in turn raises the question that the IEA projections for
CO2 emissions from the energy sector, at least in the “Current Policies” scenario, might be
considerably inflated [12].
This is a striking and unexpected finding, which bears repeating, as we find that even
within the most conservative scenarios (not including commitments from NDCs), WEO
projections in a period of 12 years can still have such a relative variation. It may also
indicate that the general transformation in global energy systems required to meet the 2 ◦C
target may be slightly less difficult than has been suggested.
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We note, however, that in this work the more sustainable “450” or “Sustainable Devel-
opment” and the “New Policies” scenarios (the latter already taking into account NDCs
policy), were not considered. One thing that this analysis seems to suggest is that perhaps
the so-called Reference (or BAU) scenarios should already include not only all adopted
policies, but the policies strongly expected to be implemented in the short to medium term
as well [58]. By turning the “New Policies” scenario into the “Reference” or baseline, this
could have an important psychological effect on policy makers and stakeholders around
the world. In this context we note that although the “Current Policies” should obviously
be read as: “if nothing else changes, and under such and such assumptions, this is what
we can expect to happen” they are much more often utilized by several large companies
and governments around the world as “this is what is most probable to happen”. In this
respect, these projections have been used as an argument for all types of (extreme) fossil
fuel expansion projects, including coal mining in Australia, Alaskan offshore oil drilling,
and Canadian Tar Sands, under the guise of satisfying projected energy demand [12].
Furthermore, the differences between regions, such as the OCED and India and
Africa, should perhaps be acknowledged more carefully in the modeling exercise itself.
As an example, in the case of OECD Europe many of the main issues revolve around
restructuring an energy system already established many decades ago and deciding what
the best financial incentives are for decommissioning the most polluting power plants and
industrial facilities [59]. In contrast to this, in regions such as Africa, India, and parts of
Southeast Asia, many of the relevant investment decisions regarding energy systems have
not yet been made, and issues such as air pollution, high child mortality rates, or stranded
assets could play a much more relevant role, thus tilting the balance towards renewable
energy generation [17,60].
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Appendix A
Table A1 shows the regions/countries considered in this work (besides world: OECD,
OECD Europe, OECD North America, China, India, Russia, and Africa) and the corre-
sponding countries in the case of regional aggregations. Large GHG emitters, such as
Brazil and Indonesia, were left out of this analysis due to the very large impact of land
use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) in their GHG emission trends, and thus
the smaller relative importance of energy-related GHG emissions 30]. The definition of
regional groupings of countries is strictly the one adopted by the IEA in each version of
the WEO. This is because we were comparing the results of the IEA’s energy and CO2
emission projections across time and with historical values. To do so, we were limited by
the often-changing definition of regions considered in the WEO. OECD Pacific countries
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are shown since these are also accounted for in the sum of OECD countries. Missing from
the list of OECD countries is Chile since the South America region was not separately
considered in this work.
Starting from 2017, there was a significant change in the WEO regional definitions, and
the OECD Europe group was no longer considered [42]. Instead, there was a new regional
definition called “Europe”, consisting of all the (by then) 28 countries of the EU (of these,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania were not previously
included in the “OECD Europe” grouping) plus Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Gibraltar, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the
Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine as well as Iceland, Israel, Norway, Switzerland, and
Turkey, which were previously also included in the “OECD Europe” regional definition.
As for the other four regions not included in the several OECD definitions, the data
for Russia were only considered starting from the WEO 2000, since before that it was
grouped under the heading of either “Countries of the former Soviet Union” (WEO 1994,
1996) [31,32] or “Transition Economies” (WEO 1998) [28]. We note that in a group consisting
of 15 countries in total, the Russian Federation emissions accounted for 63%, 66%, and
66% of CO2 emissions, in 1994, 1996, and 1998, respectively, according to data from
www.iea.org/statistics (accessed on 25 October 2020). Other large emitters during this
period include Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
In the WEO reports of 1994, 1996, and 1998 India appears grouped under the “South
Asia” definition [31–33], and we used those values as a proxy for India, due to its very large
size compared to the other countries in that group (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and
Nepal). Starting from the WEO in 2000, the values for India were shown separately in all the
WEOs and were thus considered in the present analysis [34]. In this group of five countries,
and for the years 1994, 1996, and 1998, India’s CO2 emissions accounted for approximately
87% of the total, its TPED for about 82%, its share of population was 77%, and the share in
electricity consumption varied between 85% and 86% (www.iea.org/statistics and World
Bank data, accessed on 25 October 2020).
In the case of China, we strictly adhered, once again, to IEA definitions. Exact def-
initions can be found at the end of each WEO (Section “Regional definitions”), and it is
routinely considered that data for China includes Hong Kong as well (since 1997), but that
“Chinese Taipei” is not included. Finally, the list of countries under the regional definition
of “Africa” has remained constant throughout the years.
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Note: OECD country Chile is not included (see text). * Indicates non-IEA membership as of 2019. + Denotes that the countries it precedes were added to the group of countries in the respective region.
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Appendix B
In order to better analyze the trends found in this work, we took into consideration the
general evolution of several economic indicators in the past decades for the eight regions
considered. Table A2 thus shows the values for: population, CO2 emissions from the energy
sector, and GDP (in USD in 2010, PPP) for the eight regions, as well as their evolution
between 1990 and 2013.









GDP PPP (USD Billion
in 2010) % Variation
‘90–’13
1990 2013 1990 2013 1990 2013
World 5288 7185 36% 20.518 32.288 57% 46.097 98.997 115%
OECD 1069 1265 18% 11.020 12.031 9% 29.088 45.719 57%
OECD
Europe 543 596 10% 3924 3563 −9% 12.307 18.697 52%
OECD
N. America 363 474 31% 5508 6187 12% 11.047 19.524 77%
China 1135 1357 20% 2089 9191 340% 1698 15.894 836%
India 870 1279 47% 530 1853 249% 1496 6356 325%
Russia 148 144 −3% 2163 1514 −30% 2715 3201 18%
Africa 629 1122 78% 529 1086 105% 2106 5012 138%
Note: Population data from World Bank Open Data: (1) United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision.
(2) Census reports and other statistical publications from national statistical offices, (3) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, (4) United Nations
Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics Report (various years), (5) US Census Bureau: International Database, and (6) Secretariat
of the Pacific Community: Statistics and Demography Program. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
(accessed on 25 October 2020); Energy and emission data from IEA Energy balances and indicators. Available at: https://www.iea.org/
statistics (accessed on 25 October 2020).
As seen in Table A2, the different regions vary greatly and had very different trajecto-
ries. Africa, for example, had the largest population growth between 1990 and 2013 (left
columns), double that of the relative increase in the world in the same period (78% ver-
sus 36%, respectively). However, its GDP only grew slightly above the world average
(right columns), 138% versus 115%, respectively. China, India, and Africa experienced
the largest growth in CO2 emissions from the energy sector between 1990 and 2013 (mid-
dle columns, 340%, 249%, and 105%, respectively), whereas emissions decreased slightly
in OECD Europe during the same period (−9%) and by a substantial factor for Russia
(−30%). In the same period, China’s GDP grew by a factor of 9.36 and India’s by a factor of
4.24 (right columns).
Table A3 then combines the indicators shown in Table A2 with energy statistics for
the same time period, looking at the variation of TPED, electricity consumption (both in
units of MWh), and CO2 emissions from the energy sector, in terms of per capita (top half)
and intensity per USD one thousand in 2010 (bottom half). These three specific fields are
closely related to the ones analyzed in the rest of this work.
From Table A3 we see that nearly all indicators improved their performance over that
time period in terms of economic efficiency (i.e., decreased intensity per unit of economic
value). The only exception occurred for electricity intensity in China, with an increase of
6%. In terms of per capita indicators, the situation is more mixed. For example, the very
modest reductions made in TPED per capita in the OECD, OECD Europe, and OECD North
America (−1%, −3%, and −9%, respectively) can be contrasted with the huge increases in
China and India (179% and 73%, respectively), and the same can be said in terms of CO2
emissions per capita, with OECD Europe registering the largest decrease (−17%). In this
period, all regions increased their electricity consumption per capita, with the exception
of Russia (−7%). In the case of Africa, its per capita increases were all below the world
average, which can be in part explained by the very large population growth (Table A2)
not being accompanied by a proportional growth in energy usage [17,45].
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1990 2013 1990 2013 1990 2013
World 19.30 22.27 15% 1.83 2.72 48% 3.88 4.49 16%
OECD 49.31 48.85 −1% 6.01 7.44 24% 10.31 9.51 −8%
OECD Europe 34.85 33.97 −3% 4.12 5.14 25% 7.22 5.98 −17%
OECD N.
America 72.58 65.93 −9% 8.73 9.69 11% 15.18 13.05 −14%
China 8.95 24.94 179% 0.40 3.31 729% 1.84 6.77 268%
India 4.09 7.08 73% 0.25 0.68 176% 0.61 1.45 138%
Russia 68.96 58.34 −15% 5.57 5.19 −7% 14.59 10.55 −28%
Africa 7.24 7.86 9% 0.41 0.53 30% 0.84 0.97 15%
Region





USD 2010) % Variation
‘90–’13
Carbon Intensity
(t CO2e/1000 USD 2010)
% Variation
‘90–’13
1990 2013 2013 1990 1990 2013
World 2.21 1.62 −27% 0.21 0.20 −6% 0.45 0.33 −27%
OECD 1.81 1.35 −25% 0.22 0.21 −7% 0.38 0.26 −31%
OECD Europe 1.54 1.08 −30% 0.18 0.16 −10% 0.32 0.19 −40%
OECD N.
America 2.38 1.60 −33% 0.29 0.24 −18% 0.50 0.32 −36%
China 5.98 2.13 −64% 0.27 0.28 6% 1.23 0.58 −53%
India 2.38 1.42 −40% 0.14 0.14 −4% 0.35 0.29 −18%
Russia 3.77 2.62 −31% 0.30 0.23 −24% 0.80 0.47 −41%
Africa 2.16 1.76 −19% 0.12 0.12 −3% 0.25 0.22 −14%
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